Organizations today need governance to sustain their legitimate and competitive position. Shareholders, policy makers, media, academics and top managers have put corporate governance high in their agenda. Recent scandals, public scrutiny and globalization have raised broad social and institutional demands upon corporate governance structures and practices. As a consequence, public-company boards have come under intense scrutiny worldwide with new requirements. Codes of good practices in corporate governance are being written and are enforced in diverse ways. The compulsory inclusion of independent directors and the formation of auditing committees has been applied in many countries. In the tough post-Enron environment, as Biggs (2004) points out, serving on a board of directors is much more difficult than before. Daily et al (2003) have discussed the main limitations in the existing studies on corporate governance. They have pointed out that most of the investigations rely upon agency theory. This theoretical lens has provided appropriate explanations of the economic rationale of Corporate governance models. However, institutional aspects of the evolution of Corporate governance, such as the institutionalization and diffusion of practices, and process-based aspects of the internal working of boards, have received scant attention. In particular, aspects such as those regarding the internal processes, the role, the personalities, the commitment or the personal values intervening in the board of directors have been so far neglected by most of the investigations (Dalton et al, 1998; Daily et al, 1999; Dierickx, 2003) .
We sustain that the New institutional theory of organizations (NIS) may prove useful to effectively address the recent evolution of Corporate governance. In general terms, NIS models of institutional change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Dacin et al., 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002) provide, among others, descriptions of stages of field evolution and processes of institutionalization. Following the same research line, investigations on institutional determinants of Corporate governance differences across countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) and on the diffusion of governance practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) have uncovered the social motives behind the convergence of Corporate governance models worldwide and the diffusion of codes of governance. In the same vein, NIS approach may shed light on the internal working of boards by tracing how agents build legitimating accounts from the reproduction and the idiosyncratic tailoring of cultural accounts (Creed, Scully and Austin, 2002) . In other words, NIS could help uncover what happens beyond the doors of board meeting rooms.
Based on these theoretical assumption, we call for a research program investigating how the boards' functioning is affected by the pressures of the institutional environment. The research program addresses the following research question: what are the expected changes in the boards' structure and practices due to institutional pressures in the corporate governance domain? As a starting point of this program, in this paper we focus on codes of governance. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) define the code of governance are defined "a set of best practice recommendations regarding the behaviour and structure of the board of directors of a firm" (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004: 417) . From our perspective, the emergence of codes of governance represents, for a board of directors, an institutional pressure directly affecting its structure and practice. So, we aim at addressing the following research question: which are the determinants of the institutionalization of codes of governance?
The paper is structured in three sections. First, we describe the process of institutionalization of codes of governance. In this section we outline the theoretical approach to study the institutionalization process of codes of governance. Then we describe the institutionalization of codes of governance following the NIS theoretical approach. We build propositions on the role of actors as determinants of the institutionalization of codes of governance. Second, we introduce data and results of an empirical analysis on the adoption of codes of governance. Finally, we discuss the implications for theory and practice of the propositions and outline a few avenues for the advancement of research programs in the corporate governance domain.
THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CODES OF GOVERNANCE

Institutionalization: theoretical premises
The process of institutionalization has been one of the main object of investigation within the New institutional school. Studies on institutionalization have largely built upon the social constructionist view outlining the role of actors in creating and reproducing legitimating accounts (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) . Since Zucker (1977) study on the determinants of cultural persistence, institutionalization of practices have been described in several fields such like public organizations (Tolbert and Zucker, 1982) , health care (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997) , universities (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988) , large conglomerates (Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994) .
Empirical studies of institutionalization processes have brought on the surface the issue of the existing relation between the new institutional perspective and organizational change. Institutionalization processes are usually seen as leading towards convergence (isomorphic change at the field level). However, descriptions of institutionalization processes have often revealed how institutionalized practices have legitimated the emergence of new actors or the re-definition of field boundaries (non isomorphic changes at the field level). Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) have tried to build a general model of the different stages of institutionalization that aim to show how new institutional theory can be consistent with both isomorphic and non isomorphic change.
In their model, Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) identify six stages leading towards the full institutionalization of a practice and, consequently, towards an institutional change at the field level (either isomorphic or non isomorphic): 1) precipitating jolts, 2) deinstitutionalization, 3) preinstitutionalization, 4) theorization, 5) diffusion, and 6) reinstitutionalization.
Events regarding social, technological or regulatory transformations put at the stake the taken for grantedness of existing practices. These precipitating jolts play the role of the external shocks outlined by Powell (1991) as sources of institutional transformation. As existing practices are destabilized, new institutional players may enter in the field or existing actors can gain legitimacy by proposing new ideas and practices. In this way, rooms for fresh action are opened in the field. Isomorphic pressures decrease and organization can pursue autonomous path of innovation based on technical viability rather than conformity to extant social norms/myths. This opens possibility for competing institutionalization processes. The generation of innovations leads towards the theorization of the different innovations in abstract terms so to point out properties and expected outcomes. During theorization, emerging innovative practices are framed and structured so to meet existing social requirements. In this way, innovations are made comparable in terms of technical proficiency (pragmatic legitimacy) or consistency with prevailing normative prescriptions (moral legitimacy). The link between the institutionalization and the structuration process has been explored by Barley and Tolbert (1995) .
Successful theorization paves the way to diffusion. The stage of diffusion has raised large academic interest. In broad terms, diffusion occurs once innovative practices are objectified and meet wide social consensus due to their legitimacy. However, this view of diffusion have been largely criticized as intrinsically mechanistic. Alternative perspectives, such those of translation and framing, have been developed in order to bring actors, agency and local adaptation back in the institutionalization picture (for an analysis of the different perspectives on diffusion, see Creed, Scully and Austin, 2002) . When the density of adoption provides an innovative practice with cognitive legitimacy, it can be said it becomes fully institutionalized. Full institutionalization means taken for grantedness; innovative practices are socially accepted within a field as "the way things are". The adoption of fully institutionalized practices becomes a requisite to display social conformity and legitimacy.
In Figure 1 we represent the model proposed by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) .
The Institutionalization Process of Codes of Governance
Codes of governance are a set of "best practice" recommendations regarding the behavior and structure of the board of directors of a firm (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004: 417) . Compliance with codes provisions are voluntary, even though conformity to recommendations have been increasing over time in most of the countries. According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) , two objectives are mentioned in almost all the codes of governance: improving the quality of companies' board governance and increasing the accountability of companies to shareholders. Codes of governance arose as a response to corporate mismanagement. Put forward by shareholders' associations, institutional investors or important corporate governance associations, they are written by investors themselves, consultants and practitioners. Even international political and economic entities have a saying. For example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999, have been widely adopted as a benchmark both in the OECD countries and elsewhere. These codes have become critical since the creation of the corporate governance ratings linked to them (e.g. Institutional Shareholder Services or Governance Metrics International). Institutional investors apply these ratings to classify their investments. Moreover, institutional investors like CalPERS or TIAA CREF, have also edited their own guidelines for good corporate governance and created their own rating system (Reynolds, 2002) .
The context in which the institutionalization process of codes of governance occurs is characterized by the prevalence of CEOs on boards, not much regulatory interventions and a minor role played by institutional investors. In this context, codes of governance are developed only in the US where in 1978 the Business Roundtable issued a report entitled The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporations. The report was a reaction to the hostile takeover wave characterizing the age of large conglomerates in the US.
Codes of governance developed in other countries at the end of the eighties (see Table 1 ). Many precipitating jolts emerged in that decade. First, business models changed from conglomerates to core competences. This change marked the performance decline of many business systems in Europe. At the same time, Stock Exchange markets experienced major abuse on minority stakeholders as the basis of larger financial scandals that will emerge in the early nineties. In this context, regulators tried to formulate a response to the emerging social demand of glasnost and accountability at the corporate level.
These precipitating jolts transform the network of actors operating within the corporate governance domain. Deinstitutionalization of the existing institutional setting in the eighties occurred by the ascendance of new actors directly involved in the formulation of rules about corporate governance. Among them, institutional investors and market regulators attempt to provide the business field with new rules. Moreover, certain institutions such like ISS (Institutional Shareholders Service) progressively assumed the role of market watchers and professional associations started producing rules having an impact on the internal functioning of boards of directors.
During the eighties, many countries have hosted significant debates on corporate governance and on feasible rules to increase firms' accountability. This stage of preinstitutionalization, where competing rules were proposed and analyzed, has characterized the eighties; in Hong Kong and Ireland, codes of governance have been issued before 1991. The preinstitutionalization stage is interrupted by the theorization effort made by the Cadbury Committee in 1992 by the issue of the Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. The Cadbury Report marks the end of the experiments about codes and establish a sort of rules for an effective regulation on corporate governance. After that, the adoption rate of codes of governance increased significantly worldwide (see Figure 2 ).
After the issue of the Cadbury Report in 1992, we can assume that the diffusion stage of the institutionalization process begins. Diffusion is not only characterized by the peak of issue of codes of governance but also by the action of different actors in the corporate governance domain. In particular, consulting firms have diffused the codes of governance ideas through the elaboration of codes and the influence on institutional investors demanding new rules, on regulators framing the codes and on corporation adopting them (for instance, McKinsey has been instrumental in the creation of Directors' Institutes around the world). Universities have offered an increasing number of board teaching programs. Most of these programs include the education on codes of governance and corporate accountability. Empirical research assuming the positive effect on overall financial performance of firms adopting codes got together with the increasing rate of adoption. Similar research have attempted to demonstrate the advantages of newly prescribed rules, such like majority of independent members, board heterogeneity, board size, etc.
We see codes of governance in the process of acquiring cognitive legitimacy. As Gregory and Simmelkjaer, (2002) sustain, although codes of governance are not mandatory, most corporations follow prescriptions closely. This goes in the direction of considering codes of governance as taken for granted. Taken for grantedness is also enforced by the large number of actors involved in issuing codes of governance. Consistently with the New Institutional approach, if codes of governance are taken for granted, actors get legitimacy if they are involved in issuing codes. So, the increasing number of actors involved can be considered as a proxy of the full institutionalization of codes of governance.
Widely diffused practices are endorsed by actors who aim at getting the legitimating effect of institutionalized practices. At the same time, the number of actors endorsing a certain practice is a determinant of its full institutionalization since changes of rules, mental models or practices spread through networks of actors (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) . After the theorization of the Cadbury Report, we have identified 8 different types of actors involved in issuing codes of governance: Stock Exchange Committees, Governments, Directors' associations, Managers' associations, Business associations, Research/Teaching institutions and Investors. In addition, we have considered a further category, that of multidisciplinary codes issued by groups of actors.
We have classified the actors into four broad groups: (1) Law Makers, (2) Model Makers, (3) Market Makers, and (4) Governance enactors.
In the Table 1 , for each of the groups aforementioned we define (1) who are the representative actors that fall into the category; (2) what specific isomorphic pressure they carry, (3) what instruments or mechanisms they put into place to exert institutional pressures.
Law Makers embody all the actors that provide the laws, regulations and rules by which the organization attains the legal status necessary to operate on legitimate grounds. Accordingly, this group should at least encompass international regulatory organizations, governments and governmental organizations, and capital market authorities. International regulatory organizations establish codes and regulations that permeate across borders in aspects such as intellectual property, international commerce, banking or securities exchange. Governments and governmental organizations are the main providers of laws and regulations. Sector or function-specific agencies complement and enrich existing regulation within particular scopes of economic and organizational activity. For example, while the banking authority may establish certain such laws regarding board composition and mandatory committees, the tax authority may regulate the way board incentives should be structured. Capital market authorities are usually government agencies that establish the regulations for operation within the particular market or markets in which the organization trades (e.g. US SEC or UK FSA).
Market Makers cluster the providers of financial resources and providers of production factors: (1) they provide important resources to the organization; (2) these resources are channeled through established markets; and, (3) they are relatively passive in the functions of governance. Passivity could be due to lack of power (as the case of a small supplier) or lack of interest in exerting the power (as it is usually the case of institutional investors that manage portfolios made of hundreds of companies and lack the time or resources to intervene directly in all of them). Providers of other key inputs required by organization: suppliers of key raw materials, products or services; employees providing labor; distributors; customers buying their outputs; and, finally other competitors that by providing alternative products and services help to establish a market. We have purposefully excluded from this category key suppliers that directly intervene in the governance process. In fact, we could always think of particular circumstances under which the previous actors may become relevant speakers in the organizational destiny. If a resource becomes absolutely critical for the organization to survive, it is likely that the supplier of that resource will be intervening in the governance process directly by sitting in the board.
Model Makers embody all the actors that, while outside the board, have a saying in establishing the informal norms and mental models of board members. This group encompasses market assessors, consultants and business educators. Market assessors are risk rating companies like Standard & Poors, and more recently governance raters like Governance Metrics International (GMI) or Institutional Shareholders Service (ISS), having explicit models of variables regarded as requisites for proper classification. These models are not only minimum hurdles to access resources in the market but they are also role models of what companies should do. In fact most of these assessors are active in portraying explicit links between their conceptual models and organizational performance. Consultants and auditors are promoters of conceptual solutions and models of governance (selling mental models and norms). In addition, they also act as diffusers of particular practices or models from one organization to another.
Governance enactors are those individuals that have a direct saying in the governance processes, such as controlling shareholders and large active shareholders, CEO and top managers, and individual board members. Large majority or controlling shareholders will likely participate directly (joining or even presiding the board) or indirectly by appointing a trusted person to represent them. In many cases they may even appoint the CEO. These shareholders bring into the board their own norms and values. In addition, they constantly monitor other organizations in the market. Direct competitive intelligence or board interlocks can be powerful mechanisms to find models to imitate.
Propositions
We look at the institutionalization process of the codes of governance from two interrelated perspectives. First, we look at the social determinants of the emergence of codes of governance at the country level. Second, we look at patterns of actors' involvement in issuing codes.
From the first perspective, we look at the arguments on the relevance of endogenous and exogenous forces in the institutionalization of codes of governance at the country level. Consistently with the New Institutional tenets, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argue that institutionalization of codes is driven by the need of increasing corporate governance systems' legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of governance systems is defined in terms of the conformity to widespread governance practices. From a New Institutional perspective, the development of codes of governance should be related to social pressures coming from the external environment, i.e. other countries. These isomorphic pressures are more effective for countries integrated in the global economies In this countries, financial markets are characterized by market integration, defined as connectedness with other countries' economies, and market development, defined in terms of market capitalization.
The effectiveness of governance systems is defined in terms of the protection of minority shareholders. The level of protection over time mainly depends on the character of the legal system. Even though Common law system are able to better protect minority shareholders, this legal system allows codes to be enforceable in courts. Consequently, the demand for codes is very strong and institutional actors are encouraged to produce codes. Hence, we contend that
Hypothesis 1: The development of codes of good governance in a given country is positively associated with capital market development Hypothesis 2: The development of codes of good governance in a given country is positively associated with international economic integration Hypothesis 3: The development of codes of good governance in a given country is positively associated with having a legal system based on English common law
From the second perspective, we look at the actors taking part in the theorization stage of the institutionalization process designed by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) . According to their model, different actors provide different justifications for the emergence of new practices. We argue that the involvement of the actors in the theorization process may vary depending on the stake they have in the process of institutionalization. For instance, scandals may primarily put at stake the legitimacy of those actors who have the role of regulating the system (Law makers) or are directly accountable for misbehaviors (Governance enactors). In order to prevent legitimacy crisis, these actors are active in proposing codes of governance so showing their involvement in preventing scandals. As the determinants of institutionalization are the same worldwide, we would expect that the different actors have the same stake worldwide. As a consequence, we would expect that actors' involvement follows the same pattern. This assumption implies that in each country actors get involved in issuing codes according to the same sequence.
Hypothesis 4: There is a stable order of actors' involvement in issuing a code.
Actors' theorization affects diffusion. Building on Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), we argue that Law makers and Governance makers promote normative isomorphic pressures as they are supposed to align corporate governance practices with accepted norms, values and codes of behaviors. Market makers promote coercive isomorphic pressures as they are supposed to produce requirements for organizations to get access to financial markets. Model makers promote mimetic isomorphic pressures as they are supposed to align existing practices in a country with legitimated "best" practices developed in other countries. Based on this peculiar kind of "division" of labor, we argue that in the case of the institutionalization of the codes of governance, the alignment to socially accepted norms is the first rationale for the actors' involvement in issuing a code. Hence we contend the following hypotheses: For each code we registered who was involved in the issuance. The participants where initially classified into nine categories: stock markets, governments and governmental agencies, directors associations, professionals or professional associations, manager associations, investors and universities-think tanks. According to our model (Table 1) these initial classifications were recoded into our four categories of actors: Law Makers, Model Makers, Market Makers and Governance enactors. The classification was recorded into dummy variables. It is important to notice that classifications are not mutually exclusive that is, more than one actor type can be simultaneously involved in the elaboration a code. The resulting classification is exhibited in Table 2 .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------TABLE 2 SHOULD BE PLACED AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that a given nation could have more than one code, we registered the sequence order in which the four categories of actors were involved (or not) in their country's codes. To statistically test the sequence we created 24 dummy variables (one for each possible pair of actors and order) in the form of "law maker involved before market maker", "market maker involved before law maker", "law maker involved simultaneous to market maker" and "law maker and market maker not involved in code". Each one of these variable are dichotomous: yes (1) or no (0).
We measured the independent variable of country's properties of capital market development, legal system and international integration in the manner described below.
We used World Bank's 2004 Development Indicators CD-ROM. To account for measures of market development and depth, we registered the market capitalization in millions of dollars; the market capitalization as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); the market turnover as percentage of the GDP; the market liquidity as percentage of the market capitalization; and, the number of listed firms in their domestic stock market.
To measure the degree of international economic integration we used the figures of Gross Foreign Direct Investment in the country as percentage of GDP and the openness of its trade. The latter is obtained by using the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. Given that we are interested in the likelihood of codes being developed by year end 2004 we used the most recent data available for the previous variables by the World Bank (2004), that is 2003.
Finally, we registered the legal system of the country based the practices and findings by LaPorta at al (1998) and Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) . According to their results, the largest explainer of country variance is whether or not countries have a legal system based on English Common Law. Consistently, we classified each country with a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of this condition. The sources were the two works abovementioned and they were complemented with information available in the CIA World Fact Book (2005) database, available through the internet.
Method of analysis
To test hypotheses on through three we used regressions. As the dependent variable used for the adoption of codes of good governance has two measures: one binary (the country has or has not a code) and one continuous (the number of codes issued in the country) we used logit models and Poisson regressions to analyze the determinants respectively:
When analyzing the likelihood of code adoption we use a logit regression of the form:
Model 1 To test hypothesis 4a through 4c we used simple mean comparison tests for each of the dummy variables in which we codified the sequences. If one dummy variable representing a given sequence is proven to have a significantly larger mean than other, it should be interpreted as if that specific order of appearance by institutional actors is also significantly more frequent than the other. Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations and correlation matrix of the variables analyzed to test hypotheses 1 through 3. The correlation matrix suggests that code development in a given country is positively associated with capital market development. Practically all correlations are positive and statistically significant. Larger, more developed countries have greater pressures to develop protection for the different stakeholders. These markets are precisely the ones that area more globalized, hence exposed to the pressures of global stakeholders.
Issuance of code by country (yes or no) = β0+β1*English Common Law + β2* Log of Market Cap (in million US$) + β3*Market Cap (as %GDP )+ β4*Market turnover+β5*Market liquidity + β6*Number of firms listed + β7*Gross Foreign Direct
Results
Code development and country conditions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------TABLE 3 SHOULD BE PLACED AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same holds for the presence of a legal system based on the English common law. After exploring the data this should not come as surprise as countries with common law tend to have the largest, more developed capital markets. As Aguilera and Cuervo Cazurra (2004) suggest modern capital markets need to change and adapt with the global competitive conditions. Common law countries have their markets more open to innovation. In addition, the nature of this legal system facilitates the enforceability in court, hence codes developed by actors different than law makers have greater chance of making a difference than in civil law systems.
It is interesting to notice that we found no significant relationship between the level of international economic integration and development. While it does not contradict Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) findings it does not support them either. Given that our sample is bigger than these authors' (almost twice), it would be interesting to explore if economic integration actually plays a role in promoting the code development process in a given country.
The results of testing Model 1 and Model 2 are summarized in Table 4 (with more details in Tables 5 and 6 ). Hypothesis 1 and 3 are supported and hypothesis 2 is moderately supported in the contrary direction. In fact as it is suggested by Table 3 , the largest markets are the largest recipients of foreign investments in absolute value but not in percentage of GDP nor are they the largest traders. These features are most probably associated with small markets.
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------TABLES 4-5-6 SHOULD BE PLACED AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Order in the actors' involvement in code development
To test hypotheses 4a through 4c we first explored the data by creating frequency table (Table 7) . In order to run the statistical analysis, we have articulated the hypotheses into corollaries identifying dummy variables. We then compared the means of each of the dummy variables through which we recorded the specific order of entry of institutional actors in a given country.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------TABLES 7-8 SHOULD BE PLACED AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Table 8 we appreciate that corollaries 4a1 and 4a2 are supported. That is, when law makers are involved in code development they do it before model and market makers. We also tested whether this was different in common law countries vs. civil law countries. Interestingly we found no significant difference in the pattern. We did not find support to hypothesis 4a3.
In addition, we found support to 4b1 and 4b2. This suggests that law makers and governance makers tend to appear before model and market makers in the process of code development. In fact the most frequent (and hence significant measure) is that model makers and market makers lay back until the other actors have issued the first code. While we did not test the effect of corporate scandals on the process of code development (see for example Figure 3) , it seems intuitive to assert that law and governance makers are immediate and direct targets once a corporate scandal explodes in a given country. While managers, controlling shareholders and boards of directors are the enactors of governance, law makers are responsible for setting the explicit set of rules for that enactment. Accordingly the darts of public opinion usually point out these two actors in particular. No wonder why Sarbanes Oxley Act was issued in record time after the Enron episode.
Our hypothesis that model makers would come in a an earlier stage than market makers was supported but with weak statistical significance.
It is very important to notice that our findings of prescribed patterns of actors involvement in code development is valid in not only sample wide but also for some major categories. We tested whether this sequence was different in common law countries vs civil law countries. We found no statistical difference between them.
We also tested if market size would affect this prescribed sequence. We did not find statistical difference either.
While we have portrayed theoretical arguments for this specific sequence of events to happen, yet the phenomenon is extremely relevant and deserves further research.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Codes of governance are being institutionalized worldwide. We derive this empirical evidence from the data on the adoption of codes of governance in the 78 countries of our sample. The acceleration over time of the adoption of codes reflects the fashion-like pattern investigated by Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999) . However, codes of governance seem to become taken for granted institutions, at least in many countries.
Our analysis goes into two directions; on one side we attempt a country-based analysis to see the determinants of codes issuing within countries. On the other side, we focus on actors playing a role in the institutionalization process.
As to the first direction, the empirical evidence reported in the last section reveals how the environment predicts the diffusion of codes. This argument recalls the New institutional hypotheses of environmental pressures shaping the process of institutionalization within society. Our sample confirms the arguments developed by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) : market integration, market size and legal systems can predict the adoption of codes. In particular, Common law countries are more likely to adopt codes that Civil law countries.
We frame this argument in the theoretical direction outlined by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) . Market and legal structures are the contexts where significant social events occur. Precipitating jolts occur within this contextual framework; so, the empirical evidence of the significance of market structures and legal systems outlines which precipitating jolts affect the institutionalization process of codes. In particular, the evolution of market capitalization and the steps of economic integration seem to start up the institutionalization process.
Interestingly enough, we do not find evidence that scandals affect the process. They don't seem to be precipitating jolts for codes of governance. This counterintuitive result can be explained because codes of governance may anticipate scandals to support the legitimacy of regulators. Regulators, in fact, are at stake once scandals occur since they are supposed to defend minority shareholders rights.
As to the second direction, we move from the institutional hypothesis that institutionalization process reflects a kind of convergence over time and space. This convergence occurs at the stage of theorization, where the premises and the basic content of codes of governance are outlined. So, we hypothesize a pattern in the actors' involvement. We found such a pattern in the form of a sequence of involvement in issuing a code. Although the methodology adopted could be strengthened to better support the hypotheses, the empirical evidence shows the existence of such a sequence.
Two main arguments emerge. First, Law makers and Governance makers are the first to be involved in issuing a code. This may be interpreted as these actors are expected to be in charge of regulating the corporate governance processes. So their legitimacy is at stake if misconduct emerges. At the same time, these actors play a leading role in the theorization stage. Law makers are responsible of policy making and to perform this task they are called for involving other actors in the process of policy formulation. Theorization emerges from the interplay among these actors. Governance enactors follow the same pattern; when involved in theorization they need to share their view of codes with managers, professional and experts in order to legitimate their theorization. Interestingly, Law makers and Governance enactors are carriers of normative pressures; this implies that the societal context shape the institutionalization process starting with the pressure of accepted norms and values. Imitation and coercion follow suite, in line with Tolbert and Zucker (1982) arguments about early and late adopters.
Second, we found that market structures and legal systems do not predict the sequence. In other words, theorization is not shaped by market of legal forces. Theorization and the sequence of actors' involvement seem to reflect wider social dynamics than market size and legal system. This social dynamic is convergent worldwide, since the sequence is working in all countries, as a powerful iron cage embodying corporate governance practices.
In this domain, our study has a significant limitation. The sequence of involvement has not been tested within group of countries to see whether country features may affect the order in the sequence. In addition, we deal with the four group of actors as part of the sequence.
As each group consists of actors with different logic of action, the analysis of a sequence of single actors may result in different pictures and perhaps a different pattern. However, we believe that the role of Law makers and Governance enactors in the theorization stage is critical since they are able to open the discussion about the content of codes.
From these consideration a few avenues of further research may be derived. First, codes' content is the ghost in our paper. An analysis of codes' content is of help to understand whether the convergence on a sequence of involvement implies a convergence in the content that actors promote. If convergence is in the sequence of involvement and in the content of codes, homogeneity results from the institutionalization process of codes of governance.
Second, we have tried to test the determinants of the likelihood of adoption of codes. Even though we have found statistically significant arguments, we notice that there is a certain link between density of codes and the adoption of a new one. This would explain the diffusion stage of institutionalization of codes, by showing what triggers actors to jump in the process of codes issuing and diffusion. Interestingly, the density seems to explain diffusion up to a certain threshold. After that, the likelihood of adoption declines. This argument deserves more meaningful research since it could shed light on the interplay among institutional and population-based arguments. In particular, this reasoning could be proved comparing different countries so to check for the probability to more codes in a country. Intuitively, when Law makers are strongly legitimated and encompass other institutional actors, at least in the decision making process, as in the case of highly regulated countries, the code they issue may remain the only since other actors are not interested in jumping in the process. Where the competition among institutional actors is stronger in the institutionalization processes, actors different from Law makers could be encouraged to issue other codes to position themselves in the corporate governance regulation domain.
Finally, a noticeable discussion in the corporate governance research seems to evolve around the dichotomy of structure and processes. Today, most change initiatives in corporate governance arise from improvements in laws and regulations, that is to say, in sources of coercive pressures. According to our model, normative pressure, in particular those related to behavior engrained in the minds of State regulators and Governance enactors as managers and directors will likely have a large impact in the institutionalization of codes. Case-based empirical evidence should support these arguments and give an account of different courses of action that can effectively institutionalize codes.
We have largely utilized New Institutional arguments to study corporate governance practices. We believe it is important to bring new theories and models into corporate governance research. While no one can question the tremendous contribution of theories such as Agency Theory, it is clear that many issues still remain unsolved. If we want to understand the dynamics of institutionalization, it seems necessary to include other complementary perspectives. Specifically, we should look more into those that encompass sociological or collective models of action.
This is most relevant in a time like ours. While there are different models of governance across countries, all of them are being affected by a globalization sweep. Corporate governance is implicitly globalized and boards are getting more powerful and influential than ever. In this scenario, to describe how institutionalization occurs means developing a model to monitor the waves of models and practices emerging from globalized corporate governance. And, hopefully, it could also help the early detection of tsunamis, flooding corporations under the form of global scandals and misconduct.
FOOTNOTES
The list of references would be almost infinite. A search in EBSCO Business Premiere delivered 5,572 articles with the term "Corporate Governance" and 16,134 with the term "Board of Directors" published in 2003 only 
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